This study offers the unique opportunity to analyze how an unprecedented crisis such as the September 11 tragedy influences expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. Via e-mail, we asked a randomly selected group of individual investors with accounts at a German online broker to answer an internet questionnaire at the beginning of August, 2001. A second e-mail to the investors who have not yet answered, scheduled five weeks later, was postponed due to the terror attacks until September 20, which was exactly the day with the lowest share prices in Germany in the year 2001. Based on the answers to questions concerning stock market predictions, we find that return forecasts of the investors in our sample are significantly higher after September 11. The actual returns from the respective time of response until the end of the year 2001 are overestimated in both groups. The second group of investors states return forecasts that are approximately twice as high as the true realized returns. After the terror attacks, volatility forecasts are higher than before September 11. In two out of four cases, historical volatilities are overestimated. Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in the way that they underestimate the variance of stock returns. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts are mainly unaffected. Furthermore, differences of opinion are generally higher with regard to return (point) forecasts when compared to differences of opinion with regard volatility forecasts. 
Introduction
Numerous studies analyze the reactions of markets and market participants to the releases of public information, such as earnings announcements.
1
However, little is known about how market participants react in a crisis situation with a high degree of uncertainty in connection with a large drop of share prices.
Our study offers the unique opportunity to analyze how an unprecedented crisis such as the September 11 tragedy influences expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. Knowing which factors influence these forecasts is important as asset prices and portfolio allocations are driven by expectations of investors. Markowitz (1952) describes portfolio selection as a two step procedure. In the first step, investors have to form beliefs about the future performance of securities. The second step starts with these beliefs and ends with a portfolio choice. Sharpe (1964) assumes that investors think of returns of an investment in terms of a probability distribution and that they base their choices only on two parameters of this distribution: the expected value and the standard deviation.
2
These models show that expected return and the variance of assets are crucial for determining portfolio allocations or asset prices. But they are silent about the process of belief formation.
We asked a randomly selected group of individual investors with accounts at a German online broker to answer a questionnaire that we put on the internet. Among other questions 1 See, for example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Fama (1998) for a list of event studies. Kandel and Pearson (1995) analyze forecast revisions of stock brokerage research analysts and document differential interpretation of earnings announcements.
(belonging to another project, see Glaser and Weber (2003) ), investors were asked to give a median estimate and upper and lower bounds of a symmetric 90 % confidence interval of the value of two German indexes and of the price of two German stocks at the end of the year 2001 (Deutscher Aktienindex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index, BASF, Deutsche Telekom). Investors received an e-mail with the link to the questionnaire on Thursday, August 2, 2001. A second e-mail to the remaining investors who have not yet answered, scheduled five weeks later, was postponed due to the terror attacks of September 11 until Thursday, September 20, 2001 . We refer to the group of investors who answered directly after the first e-mail as "first group" and to the group of investors who answered after the second e-mail as the "second group". The second group of investors answered exactly on the day with the lowest value of the German blue chip index DAX in the year 2001. This paper offers the opportunity to study how a crisis situation that is accompanied by a large drop in share prices over a short time period of only several days affects estimates of expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. In addition to forecasts of expected returns and volatilities we are able to analyze the level of disagreement among investors ("differences of opinion" 4 ).
We do not answer the question what a rational prediction of stock prices or a rational reaction to the September 11 crisis should have looked like. The voluminous literature about rational expectations and econometric issues regarding predictions of time series and forecast evaluation tries to answer this question.
5
We study how the expectations of individual investors change in a crisis situation or after an event such as the terror attacks of September 11. We try to evaluate the plausibility of the answers of investors for example by comparing volatility estimates to historical volatilities as a crude benchmark. Unfortunately, we are not able to analyze whether the respondents of the second group actually traded stocks at the time of response. Due to an organizational restructuring, it was impossible to obtain transaction data from the online broker apart from the data set mentioned in Section 2.
This paper belongs to the strand of literature that examines the effects of the terror attacks of September 11 on financial markets and the economy as a whole. Graham and Harvey (2001, 2002) analyze, in a study close to ours, expectations of risk premia, as well as their volatility and asymmetry in a panel survey. On a quarterly basis, Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) of U.S. corporations are asked to provide their estimates of the market risk premium. One of these quarterly surveys was distributed on September 10, 2001. Some of the responses were received on September 10, 2001 via fax, others after the September 11 crisis. Graham and Harvey (2001, 2002) find that the estimate of the one year risk premium decreases sharply after September 11 whereas volatility forecasts increase. Poteshman (2003) analyzes whether there was unusual option market activity prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Anderson and Wagener (2002) analyze the impact of the September 11 crisis on expectations of future Euribor interest rates. Carter and Simkins (2002) investigate the reaction of airline stock prices to the terrorist attacks. Straetmans, Verschoor, and Wolff (2003) answer the questions whether U.S. common stocks exhibit a higher propensity towards sharp declines and whether sharp drops in stock prices tend to co-move more frequently since Septmember 11. They do not find much support for a structural change in downside risk as measured, for example, by the Value-at-Risk. A special issue of the Economic Policy Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (volume 8, number 2) analyzes economic consequences of September 11. Several authors discuss issues like economic costs (costs as direct consequences of the attacks as well as costs arising from efforts to prevent future attacks), the attacks' disruptive effects on the payments and securities settlement systems, and New York City's prospects after September 11. A special issue of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Volume 26, Numbers 2/3) deals with the risks of terrorism with a special focus on September 11.
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows. Return forecasts of the investors in our sample are significantly higher after September 11. The actual returns from the respective time of response until the end of the year 2001 are overestimated in both groups. The second group of investors states return forecasts that are approximately twice as high as the true realized returns. After the terror attacks, volatility forecasts are higher than before September 11. In two out of four cases, historical volatilities are overestimated.
Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in the way that they underestimate the variance of stock returns. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts are mainly unaffected. Furthermore, differences of opinion are generally higher with regard to return (point) forecasts when compared to differences of opinion with regard volatility forecasts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology of the study. Section 3 presents the results and the last section concludes.
Methodology
This study is based on an internet questionnaire that was part of a larger project (see Glaser and Weber (2003) The group is called the "second group". Thus, we have a response rate of about 7 %, which is comparable to the response rates of similar questionnaires.
6
In what follows, we compare return and volatility forecasts of two separate groups of investors. The differences of findings in the two groups could, of course, be due to another reason besides September 11: The two groups of individual investors might be different not only in their estimate of, say, expected returns but also in various other dimensions which would make it difficult to argue that we have estimates of a homogenous group of investors in both groups. However, we are able to compare the two groups along various dimensions such as trading activity, portfolio positions, investment strategy, or demographic information. Table 1 shows that differences of the above mentioned characteristics in both groups are small and in most cases insignificant.
8
Only the mean monthly stock portfolio turnover, the stock portfolio value, and income are significantly different in both groups. The difference in the income variable is only marginally significant. Moreover, the income variable is only available for one third of all investors. Thus, the different turnover values of both groups seem to be the only important difference. Turnover is negatively related to the stock portfolio value. Perhaps, online traders with higher turnover values who trade more often via internet also check their e-mails more often and thus answered directly after they received the first e-mail.
The above mentioned results suggest that the two groups can be regarded as two random subsamples of the whole group of investors who received e-mails.
The investors were (among other questions) asked to give upper and lower bounds of 90 % confidence intervals to questions concerning stock market forecasts (Deutscher Aktienindex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index, BASF, Deutsche Telekom) for the end of the year 2001.
10
The questions concerning return expectations were as follows: 
Results

Return Forecasts
In this subsection, we analyze the return point forecasts until the end of the year 2001 (i.e. over a horizon of 21 and 14 weeks, respectively) of individual investors. The investors were asked to state their median forecast of the value of two indexes (Deutscher Aktienindex DAX, Nemax50 Performance Index) and the prices of two German stocks (BASF, 10 There was a fifth question which was a prediction concerning the future price of a stock which was a member of the Nemax50 index in the year 2001. This question was necessary for calculating the overconfidence score based on stock market forecasts in Glaser and Weber (2003) . All results are similar to the predictions of the Nemax50. However, the time series of past prices is very short for this stock which makes it, for example, impossible to compare volatility estimates with historical volatilities. We therefore exclude the answers concerning price and volatility forecasts of this stock in this paper.
Deutsche Telekom) for the end of the year 2001. In the remainder of this paper, these four time series are indicated by the subscript i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We first transform these price or index value forecasts of individual k into returns
(1) t 1 indicates August, 2nd, t 2 September, 20th. In line with the literature (see, for example, Kilka and Weber (2000)), we analyze two measures of return forecasts. Our first return forecast measure is the median divided by the value of the respective index or the price of the respective stock. We call this forecast the median return forecast.
According to Keefer and Bodily (1983) , our next measure (henceforth mean return forecast) of time series i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, for individual k, k ∈ {1, . . . , 215} is:
where r(p) k i denotes the p fractile of the return distribution with p ∈ {0.05, 0.5, 0.95}.
11 Some studies ask directly for returns, others ask for prices. Our method of elicitation was, among others, used by Kilka and Weber (2000) and Löffler and Weber (1997) . Keefer and Bodily (1983) show numerically that equation (2) serves as a good three-point approximation of the mean of a continuous random variable. Table 2 presents the results of return point forecasts. The first observation is that the investors in both groups did not answer all questions concerning stock market predictions.
For example, 115 of 129 investors, who answered the questions after the first e-mail, provided median as well as upper and lower bound of a confidence interval to forecast DAX returns. Focusing on the DAX forecast, the median of the mean DAX return forecast is ten times higher after September 11 than before. In the first group (time of response was August 2, 2001), the median across subjects is 5.14 % over the 21 week horizon until the end of the year 2001. In the second group the median of the return forecast is 56.52 %. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test (Null hypothesis: the two populations are from the same distribution) shows that the difference is highly significant (p < 0.0001). Similar results are obtained when we focus on the median return forecast.
These results do not coincide with findings of Graham and Harvey (2002) who analyze forecasts of the one year equity premium of CFOs. On September 10, the mean one year equity premium forecast was 0.05 % whereas the post crisis estimate was −0.70 %. The difference might be explained by the fact that the CFOs possibly answered at different days and perhaps only very few days after the terror attacks in a situation of high uncertainty.
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Our subjects made their forecasts after large drops of stock prices until September 20, which was exactly the day with the lowest blue chip share prices in Germany in the year 2001 (see the German blue chip index DAX in Figure 1 ). In addition, the results of Graham and Harvey (2002) are not significant due to the low number of observations. Shiller (1987) finds results comparable to ours after the stock market crash of 1987. He sent out questionnaires to individual and institutional investors at the evening of the day of the crash (October 19, 1987) and the following four days to better understand the causes of the crash and investor behavior in a situation of suddenly dropping share prices. One question asked investors whether they knew when a rebound was to occur. A surprisingly high 29.2 % of the individual investors answered "yes" in this unprecedented situation. Investors were thus pretty sure to know when the rebound was likely to occur.
Furthermore, many individual investors stated "intuition" or "gut feeling" or just that they "knew there would be a rebound" as reasons for their conjectures.
14 Although we did not ask similar questions, the above mentioned findings by Shiller (1987) Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). If investors expect mean reversion, these return differences might be an explanation for the higher expected return for the Nemax50: The lower the returns in the previous months, the higher individuals' return forecasts. 
Volatility Forecasts
with mean (1983) show numerically that equation (3) serves as a good three-point approximation of the standard deviation of a continuous random variable.
The main (and perhaps unsurprising) result of Table 3 ) and 14 week returns (column 4 of Table 3) ).
15
Historical volatilities are often used as an objective volatility benchmark or an estimate for the future volatility.
16
Prior to the terror attacks the historical volatility of returns over the respective time horizons is underestimated in all four cases. This finding is in line with the overconfidence literature.
17
The term "overconfidence" summarizes many different phenomena: investors overestimate the precision of their knowledge, their probability estimates are often not well calibrated, they overestimate their ability to do well in the future, they think that they can control and predict random tasks, and they assess themselves as above average with regard to skills when compared to others.
18
Overconfidence is regarded as "perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment" (De Bondt and Thaler (1995), p. 389). Most behavioral models incorporate judgment biases into theories of financial markets by assuming that at least some market participants are overconfident in the way that they overestimate the precision of their knowledge or underestimate the variance of information signals. As a consequence, their confidence intervals for the value of a risky asset are too tight when compared to the rational benchmark. This assumption is in line with a variety of psychological studies that are often referred to as the "calibration" literature (see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) ). Before September 11, investors in our data set underestimate the variance of stock prices which is consistent with the assumptions of overconfidence models. However, after the crisis, the historical standard deviation of returns is overestimated in two cases (DAX, BASF). In contrast, Graham and Harvey (2002) find volatility estimates of one-year risk premiums of 6.79 % prior to the terror attacks and 9.76 % afterwards compared to historical standard deviations of one-year stock returns of 13.0 % (1980-2000) or 20.1 % (1926-2000) in the U.S.. In the cases of Nemax50 and Deutsche Telekom the historical volatility is underestimated. Note, however, the low number of past non-overlapping return observations of Nemax50 and Deutsche Telekom used in calculating the standard deviation of returns which makes the historical standard deviation as volatility benchmark questionable in these two cases.
In the case of the DAX, we are able to calculate the implied volatility over the respective forecast horizon using the German VDAX. The VDAX expresses the fluctuation range or implied volatility of the DAX index, as expected by the forward market. . Thus, the DAX volatility estimates of the investors in our sample, especially the increase of the volatility estimate after the terror attacks seem to be reasonable. One interpretation of this result is that investors rationally expect a higher risk in the economy. In addition, it is reasonable that the DAX volatility estimate is the lowest volatility estimate in both groups followed by the BASF, Deutsche
Telekom, and Nemax50 volatility estimate. BASF and Deutsche Telekom are members of the DAX index who contains 30 German blue chip stocks. An index is more diversified than a single stock that is part of the index. The index therefore has a lower volatility.
Furthermore, BASF is a low risk value stock and Deutsche Telekom is a high risk telecom stock which suggests that BASF stock returns should have a lower volatility than Deutsche Telekom stock returns. Nemax50, the New Market index in Germany, is a high risk segment.
Unreported results show that the skewness of the return distribution given by the investors in our sample is unaffected by September 11. Furthermore, we asked the group of investors whether they own the stocks of BASF and Deutsche Telekom at the date of response.
Note, that portfolio positions or transaction data are unavailable at the date of response of the investors. All the results concerning return and volatility forecasts presented in this paper are similar for investors who own or do not own the respective stock at the time of response. In addition, we find that investors who give higher return estimates, on average, also state higher volatility estimates. The investors in our sample, as a group, seem to understand the risk-return trade off.
Differences of Opinion
In this subsection, we especially focus on the level of agreement or disagreement among investors when interpreting publicly known events such as September 11. Does disagreement increase or decrease in a crisis situation? Besides the standard deviation of return and volatility forecasts across subjects we calculate a measure of differences of opinion.
Such as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) Table 4 shows that the means of the return forecasts are similar in magnitude to the medians of the return forecasts presented in Table 2 . The reason why we present the means of return forecasts in Table 4 (instead of the medians of the mean and median return forecast presented in Table 2 ) in addition to the standard deviation and our measure of differences of opinion is the fact that we scale the standard deviation by the absolute value of the mean forecast to calculate the dop measure.
20 Table 4 shows that the standard deviation of forecasts across subjects is higher after September 11. However, when we scale the standard deviation by the absolute value of the mean forecast, Table 4 reports that differences of opinions dop concerning return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks. The differences of the dop measure of DAX return forecasts before and after the crisis are driven by the mean forecasts that are close to zero. Table 5 shows the mean of the volatility forecast. Volatility forecasts are defined in Subsection 3.2. The means of the volatility forecasts are similar in magnitude to the medians as presented in Table 3 . The standard deviation of the volatility forecasts are higher after the terror attacks. However, when we focus on the dop measure, the picture is less clear. The dop values are similar for both groups. For the DAX and the BASF stock the dop measure is slightly lower after September 11. In contrast, for the stock of Deutsche
Telekom the dop measure is slightly higher after the terror attacks. For the New Market index Nemax50, the dop measure is equal in both groups. Thus, differences of opinion with regard to volatility forecasts are largely unaffected by the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks.
Furthermore, another interesting finding is presented by Table 4 and Table 5 . Differences of opinion are generally higher with regard to return (point) forecasts when compared to differences of opinion with regard to volatility forecasts. This finding is interesting as it presents an empirical test of modeling assumptions in the "differences of opinion"
and the "overconfidence" literature.
21
In both types of models, investors often receive noisy signals which are the sum of two random variables: the value of the risky asset and a random error term. Loosely speaking, "differences of opinion" models assume that investors disagree about the mean of the error term whereas investors in "overconfidence" models disagree about the variance of the error term.
22
Our results might be interpreted as an indication that modeling disagreement about mean returns has a better foundation in documented investor behavior than disagreement about the variance of returns. However, we note that this argument is speculation and needs further investigation.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyzes stock return and volatility forecasts of individual investors before and after the terror attacks of September 11. Our main results can be summarized as follows:
1. Return forecasts are significantly higher after September 11 and the large drop in 21 See Glaser and Weber (2003) for a discussion of these two strands of literature.
22 Note, however, that underestimation of the variance of signals also creates heterogeneity of conditional means (differing posterior beliefs) that are driven by information (signal realizations), not by differing opinions concerning the mean of the prior (such as, for example, in Varian (1989) ).
share prices after the terror attacks when compared to the return forecasts before the attacks.
2. After the terror attacks volatility estimates are in two out of four cases higher than the historical volatility of returns whereas before the terror attacks historical volatilities are always underestimated. Therefore, investors are not generally overconfident in the way that they underestimate the variance of stock returns.
3. Differences of opinion with regard to return forecasts are lower after the terror attacks whereas differences of opinion concerning volatility forecasts are mainly unaffected.
The higher volatility estimates of investors after September 11 might be a result of a rational anticipation of a higher uncertainty in the economy. However, a further explanation might be an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (see Tversky and Kahneman (1982) ). A higher volatility might, at least in part, arise as investors first predict the value of an index or the price of a stock in the future. If they then build their confidence intervals by putting an interval with constant range around their point (or median) estimate, they will predict higher volatilities when stocks or indexes have lower nominal values as was the case after September 11.
Other reasons for deviations of forecasts in the two groups might be the different time horizons of the forecasts (21 versus 14 weeks) as both groups were asked to state end of the year prices. However, in our view, it is unlikely that the different time horizons will be a major driving force of our results. On the contrary, one would expect that, over a shorter horizon, return and volatility forecasts should, anything else equal, be lower for the second group. However, this is not the case. The driving forces of our results are the One finding of this study is the high expected return until the end of the year 2001 of the second group of respondents. And, very striking, investors were not completely wrong:
There was a strong rebound until the end of the year 2001. Perhaps, investors think that there will be a rebound -and that is the reason, why the rebound actually occurs. 
